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ABSTRACT
Although  industrial  ized countries  have  increasi  ngly pressured  developing
countries to tighten the protection of intellectual  property, recent economic
literature has  questioned  whether  the developing  countries  should  give into
such  pressure. The  literature  has  found  that for an invention-importing
country,  where  domestic  jnvention  is scarce  or nonexistent,  protection  of
intellectual  property  developed  elsewhere  can  reduce  the countryts  vtel  fare
and, in some  cases,  world  welfare.  The  analysis presented  here  concludes  that
this finding may  not be  appl  icable  to products,  such  as antibiotics,
fungicides,  herbjcides  and  pesticides,  whose  effectiveness  diminishes  with
cumulative  use.  Protectjng  the intellectual property  rights for these
products  can increase  welfare--even  when  inventjon is provided  for  free.PROTECTI]IG  SOCIAL  I]{TEREST  III  FREE  I]IVEI{TIOH
Steohen  P. A. Brown  and  l'lilliam C. Gruben*
Federa]  Reserve  Bank  of Dal'las
I.  INTRODUCTION
In the.Uruguay  tound of Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations,  industriallzed
nations have  focused  on placing intellectual  property  rights under  the
auspices  of the General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT). These  nations
want  to use  the GATT  as a tool to motivate  countries that weakly  protect
intellectual property,  chiefly the developing  countries,  to protect
intellectual  property  rights more  strongly.  At the same  time, the developing
countrjes  fjnd it  attractive to continue  using  invention  and  innovation  in the
i  ndustri  al  i  zed  worl  d wi  thout payi  ng for  i  t.
One  of the assertions  typically  made  in arguments  favoring protection of
intellectual property  rights is that inventors  invent  for financial gain.
Protection  of intellectual  property  helps inventors  to gain from invention and
motjvates  them  to do so.  At the same  time, the protection of  intellectual
property  rights creates  a rnonopoly  for the inventor  which  reduces  welfare.
Flost  analysts  see  monopoly  as  the cost  of stimu'lating  invention.
Recent  economic  literature  (such  as Chin  and  Grossman,  1988;  Diwan  and
Rodri  k,  1991;  and  Deardorff, 1992),  however,  calls  into question  whether
developing  countries  ought  to respond  to pressure  frorn  the industrialized
countnies  to protect  intellectual property  rights.  In an  invention-inporting
country, where  domestic  'invention  is scarce  or nonexistent,  protection of
intellectual  property  developed  elsewhere  can  reduce  the country's wel  fare
and,  in some  cases,  wor'ld  welfare. The  principal assumption  motivating  these
conclusions  is that markets  in the industrial  ized  countries  are large  enough
that offering protectjon of intellectual  property in the developing  country2
adds  only sl  ightly  to the incentives  for  invention  and  innovation  in the
industri  al  ized world.  Therefore,  i  ntel  lectual property  protection impl  ies
monopoly  costs to the consumer  that are not matched  by rewards  to motivate
either local or foreign  inventors.l
These  findings  appear  consistent  with empirical  observation.  Butler
(1990)  notes  that,  as of 1988,  47 countries  did not patent pharmaceutical
products,  59  did not patent animal  varieties,  57  did not patent plant
varieties,  and  2l did not patent chemical  products. The  large majority of
these  countries  are nonindustrial  .  In additjon,  Gadbaw  and  Richards  (1988),
Gadbaw  and  Kenny  (1988),  Richards  (I988), and  Sheruood  (1990)  find
considerable  evidence  of industrial countries  continuing  to innovate  even
after developing  countries have  appropriated  their  technology  without
comDensat  i  on.
It  is, perhaps,  ironic that pharmaceutical  innovation  has  received
particular attention in the much  of the empirical work  noted  above. For some
pharmaceuticals,  nanely  antibiotics, developing  countries  may  find it  to
desirable  to protect intellectual property  rights--even  if  invention  is
costlessly  provided  by  divine intervention,  pure  altruism  or dumb  luck.
Instead,  rnany  of these  countrjes have  compromised  the effectiveness  of some
antibiot'ics,  and  other  products  with similar characteri  st  i  cs, by fail ing to
protect ownership  of the night to produce  these  products.
For  a class  of products,  such  as antibiotics, fungicides,  herbicides  and
pesticides,  effectiveness  diminishes  with cumulative  use.  For  products  such
as  these,  consumption  by one  individual  can  impose  an  externality  cost  on
society which  competitjve  consumers  and  producers  operating  in a regime
without  protection  of intellectual property  rights would  not take into5
account. As a consequence,  product  effectiveness  is depleted  at a faster than
social1y  optirnal  rate, as resistant  strains  of bacteria,  fungi, weeds  and
pests are devel  oped.
In contrast, a monopoly  producer,  who  owns  the intellectual  property
right  to such  a product, has  an economic  incentive to preserve  product
effectiveness. The  monopolist  takes  into account  how  one  individual's
consumption  affects future effectiveness  and  consequent  product  demand.  In
doing  so, the monopolist  internal  izes the externality  and  better preserves  the
product  for the future.  This  finding has  important  jmplications  for the
Uruguay  Round  negotiations,  or any  other  trade  negotiations  involving
i  ntel  I  ectual property.
II.  AN  ANALYTICAL  MODEL
[,le  develop  an analytical model  of the market  for a product  whose
effectiveness  dininishes  with cumulative  use.  In this model  , invention  is
costlessly bestowed  under  two types  of pol  icy regirnes,  one  v'rithout
inte.llectual property  protection and  one  with it.  In the regime  without
intellectual property  protection,  al1 producers  have  equal  claim  on  the
invention,  and  they  produce  in a competitive  market. In the regime  with
intellectual property  protection,  the invention  is bestowed  on  a single
producer  who  gains a monopoly.
l,le  begin  by presenting  demand  and  supply  conditions  for the product.  l{e
next develop  the social welfare  maximizing  conditions  for the market. l,le  then
compare  these  optimality  conditions  with the conditions  that would  prevail in
a conpetitive  market  (with no 'intellectual  property  protection)  and  a
monopoiized  rnarket  (with intellectual property  protection).  Finally, we4
and conclude  by comparing  the competitive
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The  quantity demanded  at any  moment  in time (Q.) is  a function
(Pr) and  product  effectiveness  (E.):
0t =  O(Pt'  Et)
of pri  ce
(l)
where  OQ./EP,  < 0 and  AQt/aEt  > 0.2
Natural  selection  drives  the process  in whjch  ant.ibiotics,  fungicides'
herbicides  and  pesticides  lose  effectiveness  with cumulative  use  over  tine.
Effectjve use  of such  a product  can  destroy alI  or most  of the target
population  of bacteria,  fungus,  vieeds  or pests  in a given  ecological  niche.
In some  cases,  small  numbers  of the target population  wilI  survive--that  is
strains that are resistant  to the antibiotic or pesticide  in use,  llith the
ecological niche cleared  of competing  members  of the target population, the
resistant strain has  a greater  opportunity  to nultiply and  fill  the ecological
niche.  Eventually,  the resistant  strains  will  take  over  the ecological  niche
and  spread  to other  similar environments.  As  this happens,  the antibiotic,
fungicide,  herbicjde  or pesticide  being  used  Ioses  jts effectiveness. Low-
valued  uses  may  accelerate  the process  in which  a product  loses effectiveness.
We  simpl  ify  the process  by assuming  that product  effectiveness  at any
moment  in time is a decreasing  function  of cumulative  consumption  to date, X.:
t  =  E(X.) (2)
where  dE,/OX,  < 0.5
At any  moment  in time, cumulative  consumption  to date is defined:
x,=1,  Q,  ar
where  r  is a dumny  of  integration for t  (time) and  Q. is the time derivative
(rate of change)  of X..
For analytical convenience,  we  rewrite demand  as an inverse  function,
incorporating  E(X,)  in pl  ace  of E.
P.  - D(Q,  ,t  ) (3)
where  dPrl0Q.  < 0 and  aPt,/axt  < 0.
SUPPLY
Production  occurs  in n identjcal plants  so  that the total quantity
produced  at any  moment  jn time (Q.) is  simply  the number  of plants (n) times
the quantity  produced  in each  plant (q):
Qt = nQt  (4)
For  an individual  fir:m,  the total cost of production  (c) is simply
expressed  as a function  of output  (q):
c. = c(9.) (5)
where  marginal  cost is positive, 0cl0q  > 0.  If  output  is distributed
efficiently  across  all  n p1  ants, the aggregate  total  cost of production  (C.)
can  be v,ritten as a function of either Q  or q.3
C,  =C(Q) =n.c(qt) (6)6
SOC  I AL H  E  LF  ARE  ITAX  I I/.I  ZAI  I OII
The  optimality  conditions  for social  welfare  maximization  serve  as a
benchmark  against  which  competition  and  monopoly  can  be compared,  Social
welfare can  be  written as the present  discounted  value  of the sum  of consumer
and  producer  surplus, evaluated  over time:
PVSH  =  l"e-"t  flototx,  x) -cr) oydt  (7)
JU  JU
where  r  is the interest rate, 1is  a dummy  of jntegratjon  for quantity  (Q)  and
C,  is defined  as 0Cl01. (To  simplify notation,  we  drop  the time  subscript  at
this point in the analysis.  It  should  be  understood  as implicit,)
Pontryagin's  maximum  principle (and  some  nranipulation)  yields the
following  optimal  ity condition  for social  welfare  maximizationl
P =Co+L (8)
Price (P) equals  marginal  cost (Co)  plus a user  cost (l).'
The  user cost represents  the marginal  value  of preserving  effectiveness
for future periods  as follows:
I  = -e  "[.'{lre 
-"" 
)  dr  (9)
where  P*  is defined  as  OP/dX.  If  .u*t.tiu.  consumption  reduces
effectiveness,  the price consumers  are  willing to pay  for the product  fa1ls
with cumulative  production,  then  P,  < 0, and  the user  cost is positive.  If
cumulative  consumption  does  not alter  effectiveness,  then Px  = 0, the user
cost is zero, and  equation  (8) becomes  the familiar optima'l  ity  condition where
pri  ce equals  marginal  cost.
The  optimality  conditions  also indicate  that the user  cost can  increase7
or decrease  in value  over time.  In particular,
\=v7+P, (  l0)
which,  given  that P, < 0, indicates that the user cost grows  more  slowly than
the interest rate,  and  declines if  P, is  sufficiently  negative.
The  optimality condition expressed  in equation  (8) serves  as a benchnark
against  which  we  compare  the competitive  and  monopolistic  cases.
COIIPETITIVE  CASE
In a purely competitive  case,  product  effectiveness  influences  demand'
but individual consuners  and  producers  ignore  the effect that individual
consumption  has  on future effectiveness.
In the competitive  case, inverse  demand  remains:
P =D(Q,  X)  (ll)
For each  firm,  profit  maximizing  conditions  are obtained  at the output
where  the firm's marginal  cost equals  the market  price:
P =ro  (12)
With  n identical firms, market  clearing  conditions  require  that the quantity
demanded  (Q) equal  the total  quantity produced  (n.q) at the market  clearing
price (P).  Given  the cost function  (6) and  Q  = nq, it  can  be  shown  that Co
equals  co.  Therefore  competition  yields the familiar case  in which  price
equal  s marginal  cost:
P =  Co  (13)
This familiar case  is not optimal  , however. llith  consumers  and
producers  ignoring the externaljty effects that consumption  has  on future8
effectiveness, the user cost found  in equation  (8) does  not arise.  Figure  I
illustrates  the effect  for a giren demand  curve  at any  moment  in time.  P* and
Q*  are the socialiy optimal  price and  quantity,  respectively, For  the given
demand  curve, the conrpetitive  narket will  yield  a lower  price,  Pc,  and  a
higher  quantity,  Qc,  than  is socially optimal  .
Comparing  the dynamics  of the competitive  case  with those  of the
socially optimal  case  is somewhat  more  complicated. Because  the competitive
narket would  produce  above  the socially optimal  rate,  the demand  curve  shifts
inward  more  rapidly than for the optimal  case.  At some  point in time, demand
in the competitive  case  will  have  shifted inward  enough  more  that output,  Q,
will  be  lower  than  if  use  of the product  had  always  been  managed  in a socially
optimal  fashion, This  condition  will  be  maintained  thereafter  until product
effectiveness  goes  to zero.  Nevertheless,  at any  moment  in time, the
curnulative  consumption  to date, X, would  be  greater and  the price would  be
lower  under  the competitive  time  path  than  under  the socially optimal  time
oath.
The  competitive  case  can  be  made  socially optimal  by imposing  a tax
equal  to the user  cost  or identifying  and  banning  low-value  uses.
Implementing  such  a tax or restricting  use  of the product  may  be problematic
if  the po1  itical  rate of discount  is higher  than  the social rate.  In cases
where  poljtical discount  rates are sufficiently high, political  actors  may  be
unwilling  or unable  to optimally  defer  consumer  use  of the product.
MONOPOLISTIC  CASE
In the monopolistic  case,  the single  seller has  an  incentive  to consider
how  current consumption  affects future effectiveness  because  the loss in
effectiveness  will  be  reflected  in future sales.  At the same  time, however,  a9
monopolist  has  the incentive  to earn  monopolistic  rents  by restricting output,





Pontryagin's  maximum  principle (and  some  manipulation)  yields the
monopolist's  prof.i  t -nraxi  mi  zi  ng conditlon as follows:
(  l4)
P+Pa.Q=Co+l (  ls)
Itlarginal  revenue  1R  + PoQ)  equals  marginal  cost (Co),  plus the user  cost (l),
l{here  Po  js the reduction  in price require  to sell the marginal  unit.
Equations  (9) and  (10) above  descnibe  the user  cost.
The  presence  of the user cost in equation  (I5)  shows  that the monopolist
takes into account  how  current consumption  affects future effectiveness.  At
the same  time, however,  the monopolist  also  restrjcts output  to obtain  a
monopoly  rent.  Figure  I illustrates monopolistic  behavior  for a given  demand
curve  at any  moment  in time.  P* and  Q* remain  the socially optimal  price and
quantity.  For  the given  denand  curve,  the monopolist  will  set a higher  price,
P* and  sell a smaller  quantity,  Q'  than  is optimal  .  (The  monopolist  obtains
a margina1  revenue  of tl\.)
Comparing  the dynamics  of the monopol  istic  case  with those  of the
socially optimal  case  is somewhat  nore  compljcated.  Because  the monopolist
would  produce  below  the socially optimal  rate, the demand  curve  will  shift
inward  less rapidly than  for the optimal  case. At some  point in time, demand
in the monopolistic  case  will  have  shifted inward  enough  less that output,  Q,
will  be  higher  than  if  use  of the product  had  always  been  managed  in a
socially optimal  fashion. Thjs  condition  will  be  maintained  thereafter  untilIO
the product  effectiveness  goes  to zero.  Nevertheless,  at any  moment  in time,
the cumulative  consumption  to date, X, would  be lower and  the price would  be
higher  under  the monopolistic  time  path  than  under  the socially optimal  time
path.
One  method  of encouraging  the monopolist  to behave  in a socially optimal
manner  is to estabi  ish a government  mandated  price path in which  the market-
clearing  price in each  period  is set equal  to rnarginal  cost plus user  cost.
i.ljth a set price path, the monopolist  would  face a perfectly elastic denand,
and  the incentive  to restrjct output  would  be  el  iminated. Setting  such  a
price path  would  require considerab'le  information  about  demand  and  true
production  costs.  In addition,  such  a po1  icy is rife with problerns  of
po1  itjcal  influence  because  the nonopolist  would  have  an incentive  to lobby
government  officials  to raise the regulated  price above  the optimal  Ievel  .
An  alternative  approach  for achieving  optimality  in the monopolistic
case,  is to offer the monopolist  a production  subsidy  equal  to -PoQ.  The
governnent  could avoid  making  a transfer to the monopolist  by auctioning  off
permanent  rights to monopolize  the product's  market  with the government
subsidy  jn place.  Under  competitive  bidding,  the monopoly  rents  and  subsidies
would  be recaptured  by the government.  0f course,  such  a solution requires a
credible commitment  on the part of the government  to honor  the contract.
III.  C0NCLUSI0N:  COMPETITI0N  V. M0N0P0LY
As shown  above,  neither competition  nor monopo'ly  is consistent  with
social  welfare  maximization  when  the oroduct's  effectiveness  decl  ines  with
cumulative  use.  A competitive  industry  would  charge  too low  a price and
deplete  the product's  effectiveness  too rapidly.  A monopolist  would  charge1l
too high a price and  produce  too little  of the product.
Our  results are broadly  consistent  with those  of Chin  and  Grossnan,
Diwan  and  Rodrik, and  Deardorff.  They  find that a competitive  industry rould
provide  too Iittle  invention,  and  a monopoly  too little  output,  to maximize
social welfare.  In their analysis,  competition  is preferable  to monopoly
because  the welfare  cost of the lost stimulus  to invent  is less than  the
welfare cost of restricted output.
In our case, competition  is preferable  to monopoly  when  the welfare cost
of failing to protect  product  effectiveness  is less than  the welfare  cost  of
restricted output.  0n the other hand,  monopoly  is preferable  to competition
when  the welfare cost of failing  to protect product  effectiveness  is more  than
the welfare cost of restricted output.  [,le  are unable  to put prior values  on
these  costs other than to say  they depend  on the elasticity  of demand  and  the
rate at which  product  effectiveness  'is depleted  through  cumulative  use.  In
some  cases,  a monopoly  that protects jntellectual  property  may  be preferable
to competition,  even  when  invention  is costlessly  provided,
If  we  simultaneously  consider  both  the incentive  to invent  and  the
depletion  of product  effectiveness,  competition  would  result in too Iittle
invention  and  too rapid  depletion  of product  effectiveness. A monopolist
would  produce  too little  of the product.5  As  a consequence,  the case  for
protecting intellectual  property  rights is  substantially stronger  for products
whose  effectiveness  is deoleted  with cumulative  use.
An  even  stronger  case  can  be  nade  for government  intervention in the
market  for a product  whose  effectiveness  diminishes  with use--whatever  the
regime  of  intellectual  property  rights and  market  structure.  Governmenl
intervention can imDrove  the allocation of a oroduct  whose  effectivenesst2
diminishes  with cumulative  use  in either a conpetitive  or
The  competitive  market's  al  location of the product  can  be
either the inposition  of a tax equal  to the optimal  user
valued  uses. The  monopolist's  al  location  of the product
through  either a production  subsidy  or the imposition  of
path.  0f course, informational  and  politjca'l  factors can
appl  ication of such  policies.
monopol  istic  case.
improved  through
cost or a ban  on low-
can be improved
the optimal  pri  ce
inhibit the optimall5
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the shortcornings  of the analysis.
and  do not necessarily  represent
or the Federal  Reserve  System.
l.  Divran  and  Rodrik  (1991)  and  Frischstak  (1990)  find that developing
countries can improve  their  welfare by protecting intellectual  property  when
they have  a strong  demand  for  a product  that is not particularly  useful in the
i  ndustri  al  i  zed  countri  es  .
2.  0ver sone  ranges  of effectiveness,  consuners  nay increase  their  use  of
an  antibjotic, fungicide,  herbicide  or pesticide  to offset reduced
effectiveness.  lie abstract from  this  case  by assuming  that they would  do so
only at a reduced  price.  Therefore,  at a given price, consumption  falls  with
effectiveness.
3.  For  simpl  icity,  we  assume  the same  number  of plants  in all  three  cases.
This  assumption  simpljfies the analysis  without  affecting  the results.
4.  This  optimality  condition  should  be  famil  iar to those  who  are  versed  in
the econonics  of exhaustible  natural resources. See  Dasgupta  and  Heal (1979).
5.  The  monopol  ist's  incentive  to restrict output  may  be  I  imited,  however,
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